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Case Notes

Filed Tariff Doctrine Allows Sprint's Unilateral
Amendment to Fridays Free Agreements
by Juliette Luther

"I know I agreed to do this and you
are paying the agreed upon price, but
it is too difficult for me to deliver so I
am just going to deliver 25% of what
I agreed to deliver. God speed and
good luck to you."
Introduction
Suzanne Cahnmann's class action
against Sprint Corporation appeared to
be a relatively straightforward
consumer claim, brought in Illinois
state court, for breach of contract, fraud
and injunctive relief. The complaint,
after all, followed Sprint's enactment of
unilateral changes to contracts entered
into with long-distance customers;
changes which drastically reduced
promised savings on calls. On January
7, 1998, however, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the ruling of the United States
District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois, in Cahnmann v. Sprint Corp.,
reinforcing long-distance telephone
carriers' right to unilaterally amend
any offered calling rates. Though the
court explicitly placed the burden on
the consumer to ensure the rates
offered are true prior to entering into
any contract, long distance carriers are
still left with the power to unilaterally
amend any rates, at any time they
desire.' In short, no matter how much
investigating the customer does on a
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carrier's filed rate prior to contracting
for service, all agreements are subject
to unilateral changes by the carriers. As
a result of this filed tariff doctrine, the
court refused to grant injunctive relief
from Sprint's deceptive advertising
practices.
This Note addresses the reasonings
employed by the district and appellate
courts that led to their rulings in favor
of Sprint. Part I explains the factual
background of the case leading to this
litigation, and the arguments presented
to the district court. Part II first reviews
the ruling of the district court, which
established Sprint's power to
unilaterally amend tariffs filed with the
Federal Communications Commission
("FCC"). Part II then also discusses the
Seventh Circuit's rationale in affirming
the district court's holding. Part III
analyzes the split among the federal
circuit courts of appeals with regard to
the question of federal jurisdiction over
federally-regulated common carriers
and whether the states possess the
power to enjoin carriers from
fraudulent and deceptive marketing
practices. Part IV reviews the impact
resulting from the Seventh Circuit's
affirmation of the district court's
holding in favor of Sprint, and the
adverse effect this ruling has on
consumers. Part V concludes, however,
that until the issues surrounding the
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filed tariff doctrine are resolved by the
United States Supreme Court,
customers are left powerless to enforce
terms embodied in agreements entered
into with long distance carriers.
Background

2

This class action was originally
brought in Illinois state court by the
plaintiff, Suzanne Cahnmann, when
Sprint unilaterally changed the terms
of its "Fridays Free" long-distance
calling promotion. The "Fridays Free"
advertisement was offered in January
1996 to small businesses only. It
provided that, upon subscribing to
Sprint for at least $50 worth per month
of long distance calls, customers could
make free long-distance calls on
Fridays, up to $1,000 worth per month,
to anywhere in the world for one year.
Just prior to offering this promotion,
Sprint filed a tariff with the FCC, as
required by the Federal Communications
Act. This tariff, as with any tariff filed
with the FCC, set forth the terms of the
long-distance calling promotion.
Approximately nineteen countries
were originally included in the
promotion. Sprint's intention in
offering these free Friday calls was to
attract customers from other longdistance carriers with its special low
calling rates.
Only four short months after the
introduction of its "Fridays Free"
calling plan, and without the consent
of any of its customers, Sprint removed
ten countries from the tariff filed with
the FCC. These included Israel, Bolivia,
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China, Ecuador, India, Iran, Myanmar
(formerly Burma), Pakistan, Thailand
and the Dominican Republic. In an
attempt to compensate for this
alteration, Sprint offered a 25%
discount from its regular long distance
rate for calls made on any day of the
week to nine of the remaining
countries, except the Dominican
Republic.
Consequently, this class action was
instituted in Illinois state court. The
complaint alleged purely state lawbased claims for breach of contract and
violations of the Illinois Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act. In addition, the class
sought to enjoin Sprint from
continuing its deceptive advertising
practices, to recover monetary
damages resulting from long distance
calling charges incurred as a result of
Sprint's amendment, and enforcement
of all of the terms contained in Sprint's
"Fridays Free" contracts.
In response to Cahnmann's state lawbased allegations, Sprint employed a
procedural tactic that had proven
successful in identical lawsuits brought
against it in other states. It simply
removed the case to federal court,
contending that Cahnmann's claims
were actually grounded in federal law,
not state law. Cahnmann responded
with an unsuccessful motion to remand
the action to state court, but Sprint
ultimately fied a motion for judgment
on the pleadings, which was granted
by the District Court and affirmed by
the Seventh Circuit.
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The District Court's Ruling, and
the Seventh Circuit's Affirmation
The district court began by
examining the propriety of Sprint's
removal of the case from state to
federal court. In its notice of removal,
Sprint maintained that the action
belonged in federal court based on
federal question jurisdiction and
diversity jurisdiction. Sprint's ground
for federal question jurisdiction was
actually premised on two conditions:
that Cahnmann's complaint was a
federal claim "artfully pleaded" as a
state law claim, and that Cahnmann's
claims were completely pre-empted by
federal common law and the Federal
Communications Act. The district court
dismissed Sprint's diversity
jurisdiction argument, but readily held
that removal was proper on both
grounds of federal question
jurisdiction. Without addressing the
question of complete pre-emption, the
court held that the complaint presented
federal claims artfully pled as state law
claims, making removal proper.
Once it was determined that the issue
at hand presented a federal question,
the court entered a judgment on the
pleadings in favor of Sprint. In its
analysis, the court explained that,
because Sprint is a long-distance
carrier regulated under the Federal
Communications Act, it is required to
file its tariffs with the FCC and charge
its customers in accordance with the
terms set forth therein. Specifically, the
"core" of the Federal Communications
Act demands that telecommunications
providers inform the FCC of the rates
1998

they intend to charge for each of their
services. The providers fulfill this
requirement by filing tariffs with the
FCC, setting forth the terms of the rates
to be charged by the carrier to its longdistance customers. Only the FCC has
the power to determine the
reasonableness of the rates, and the
carriers are not permitted to deviate
from the filed rates. Any agreement
entered into between the carrier and a
customer which states a rate different
from that stated in the fied tariff,
therefore, has absolutely no legal effect.
Thus, since the "Friday's Free"
agreements between Sprint and its
customers differed from Sprint's new,
amended tariff, the terms in the
original "Fridays Free" tariff no longer
had a binding legal effect.
Most significantly perhaps, the
district court held that it lacked the
power to enforce the terms contained
in the original tariff. Such enforcement,
it explained, would infringe upon the
FCC's jurisdiction. In response to this,
however, Cahnmann argued that this
jurisdictional problem could easily be
avoided by the court if it only enforced
the original "Fridays Free" filed tariff.
This way, the court would escape
intrusion of the FCC's powers, and the
cause of the Plaintiffs' increased longdistance calling charges would still be
a filed tariff. The court quickly
dismissed this argument, however, on
the grounds that Cahnmann's
suggested "original" tariff would
nonetheless be a different tariff being
enforced, and not "the" (amended)
tariff at issue. It reasoned that "the
Federal Communications Act would
Loyola Consumer Law Review e 319

[not] permit a court to choose among
several tariffs filed by a single
company over the years and enforce
whichever one it selects." This holding
results in a significant impact on longdistance customers. In essence, even if
a tariff contains a provision that a
special rate will be in effect for a
specific amount of time, it cannot be
enforced by a court.
Cahnmann's last argument was built
on the specific language contained in
the "Fridays Free" agreement, which
promised that "customers can receive
free usage (outbound international
only) on one day a week (such day to
be determined by Sprint) for twelve
months." Due to lack of precedent,
however, the court rejected the
argument that, contained in a tariff, the
phrase "customer can" means that the
carrier is obligated to provide such
service, or that the carrier promises to
provide the special service for twelve
months if the customer elects.
Writing for the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, Chief Judge Posner
affirmed the district court's holding in
all respects. Prior to beginning its
examination of the issues presented,
the court noted Sprint's reasons for
amending its tariff, which included
claims of congested phone lines and
consumer fraud (residential customers
pretending to be small businesses).
However, for purposes of reaching its
holding, the court assumed "that
Sprint had no good reason for the
amendment - or, worse, that it was
planning from the start to renege on
the offer of a full year of free Friday
calls to anywhere in the world." The
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court then agreed with the district
court's holding that Cahnmann's state
law-based breach of contract claim was
actually a federal claim. Although the
question of the Communication Act's
complete pre-emption under these
facts is not discussed by the court, it
was exactly this preemption that led
the court to conclude that federal
jurisdiction over the claims existed.
Leading up to its ultimate holding,
the court set forth a detailed
background of public utility regulation
and common carrier regulations.
Although many of these regulations
have been rolled back in recent years,
long-distance telephone service
regulation has remained in its original
form. One example of such a longstanding regulation is the requirement
of long-distance carriers to file tariffs
with the FCC.
Judge Posner found that the history
of the tariff system reaches back many
years; it was established in order to
"discourage[ ] price competition by
preventing secret discounts." Since
filed tariffs are published documents,
they supposedly prevent a longdistance carrier from discriminating
among the prices or services offered to
customers. The tariff-filing rule
continues to survive, though the
intention behind the requirement has
changed slightly. Today, tariffs must be
filed in order to discourage longdistance carriers from striking "special,
off-tariff deal[s]" with their customers;
even if the customer "reasonably relied
on the carrier's promise to file the
negotiated rate as a tariff," only the
actual, filed tariff would be enforceable.
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The only valid contract between the
customer and the provider, therefore, is
the tariff; any other agreement has
absolutely no legal effect. This wellestablished rule is the "filed tariff
doctrine." Permitting Cahnmann to
obtain relief under Illinois' common
law of contracts, therefore, "would
effectively nullify the tariff provisions
of the Communications Act."
Turning then to Cahnmann's breach
of contract claim, the court held that
the Communications Act in fact
"extinguishes the right to bring a suit
for breach of contract under state law
when the effect of the suit would be to
challenge a tariff." Because Sprint's
tariff is the contract, a suit to enforce its
terms arises under federal law. The
Seventh Circuit's view regarding the
Communication Act's preemption over
state law claims, however, is not a view
embraced by all circuits.
Split Among the Circuits
A split exists among the various
circuit courts regarding the question of
federal jurisdiction over state lawbased breach of contract claims
brought against long distance
telecommunications carriers for
changes made to their filed tariffs.
Although the Seventh Circuit clearly
explained the reasoning behind the
Communication Act's federal preemption, which extinguishes a
consumer's state law-based claims, a
number of courts have held that the
filed tariff doctrine is simply a defense
brought by the telecommunications
carrier; not an overarching preemptive
1998

doctrine. This "defense" theory rests
on the fact that, when attempting to
recover customer bill payments for
long distance calls, Sprint has regularly
brought actions in state courts. Thus, as
long as Sprint's claims for breach of
contract on the consumers' parts can
stand in state courts, it would logically
follow that the filed tariff doctrine
should only be invoked by carriers as a
defense.
A review of the circuit courts'
holdings regarding federal preemption over state law claims based on
the filed tariff doctrine shows the
degree of the split. For example, the
First, Fifth and Ninth Circuits have
held that no federal jurisdiction exists
over state-based claims brought against
common carriers. Neither the Third nor
the Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals
have ruled on the issue yet, though the
district courts therein are split.3 Courts
that have found federal jurisdiction
exists over state-based actions are the
Second, the Fourth, the Sixth, the
Eighth and the Eleventh Circuits.4
The circuits are also split with regard
to federal pre-emption over claims
alleging fraud and deceptive
marketing by federally regulated
carriers.5 The Seventh Circuit has held
that the Federal Communications Act
pre-empts state law-based fraud
claims, prohibiting states from
enjoining the carriers from continuing
their fraudulent and deceptive
marketing practices. The disturbing
result in circuits which refuse to grant
consumers the power to enjoin
telecommunications carriers from
further fraudulent acts is that long
Loyola Consumer Law Review 0 321

distance customers are left helpless, as
Suzanne Cahnmann was. The Act's
federal pre-emption over fraud claims
effectively prohibits relief from further
deceptive advertising, based on federal
courts' refusal to interfere with the
FCC's jurisdiction under the
Communications Act.
One court, however, declined to
follow the Seventh Circuit's reasoning
with regard to this issue. In Marcus v.
AT&T Corp., the Second Circuit
recently held that states do have the
power to enjoin telecommunications
carriers from engaging in deceptive
marketing.6

The Resulting Impact on
Consumers
The meaning, or result, of the filed
tariff doctrine is concisely explained by
the district court. Since the "core" of
the Federal Communications Act
dictates that long-distance carriers file
their tariffs with the FCC, only the FCC
is vested with the authority to decide
the reasonableness of those rates, and
has the sole power to amend, modify,
supersede or disapprove of the tariff.
Once they have filed a tariff, longdistance carriers are bound to the rates
set forth therein (notwithstanding
modifications by the FCC), and are
prohibited from charging either more
or less than the filed rates. Thus, until
the FCC changes the filed tariff, "the
carrier may not deviate from its terms.
It doesn't matter how eager both the
carrier and its customers are to strike a
special, off-tariff deal, or even whether
the customer reasonably relied on the
322 9 Loyola Consumer Law Review

carrier's promise to file the negotiated
rate as a tariff." 7 Most significantly, the
district court explained that, since the
filed tariffs are also made publicly
available,
"[t]he law presumes a provider
cannot effectively misrepresent its
rates. Whatever the salesman says
and whatever is advertised, the
consumer can learn the truth from
the FCC. And it matters not if the
claim arises from an amendment
to a tariff which changes the rates.
The customer is presumed to be
aware that amendments to tariffs
are always possible. If the
customer does not like the
amendment, the customer has
standing to complain to the FCC
which can invalidate the
amendment. There is, therefore,
no contract to enforce [... ].'8
Based on the Communication Act's
policy of conferring primary
jurisdiction over telecommunication
carriers' fled rates on the FCC, the
Seventh Circuit built on the district
court's reasoning, explaining that, "a
tariff filed with a federal agency is the
equivalent of a federal regulation,
[and] a suit to enforce it arise[s] under
federal law."9
The Seventh Circuit's strongest
suggestion of complete preemption,
however, lies in the following portion
of its opinion:
"[Slince the federal regulation
defines the entire contractual
relation between the parties, there
is no contractual undertaking left
over that state law might enforce.
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Federal law does not merely create
a right; it occupies the whole field,
displacing state law."10
Thus, the consumer is left with a
legally unenforceable contract,
originally entered into with the carrier
as a result of reliance on the deceptive
advertising, and without a remedy
from the court. To make matters worse,
the court here denied Cahnmann the
relief of simply enforcing Sprint's
original "Fridays Free" tariff for fear of
treading on the FCC's toes.
Conclusion
Until federal courts begin allowing
state causes of actions against
telecommunications carriers to be
brought in, and remain in, state court,
consumers will remain powerless in
their attempts to enforce the terms of
agreements entered into, or in their
attempts to enjoin the carriers from
further deceptive practices. The
Seventh Circuit's finding of federal
jurisdiction over state law-based
breach of contract claims against Sprint
denies consumers the capacity to
enforce contractual terms which have
been unilaterally amended by the
carriers. Through their federal
jurisdiction over breach of contract,
common law and consumer fraud
claims, courts are left to decide that the
Communications Act effectively preempts state causes of action. Thus, the
filed tariff doctrine is invoked, and
consumers lose the opportunity to
enforce terms of the original tariff, as
well as the power to enjoin the carrier
from continuing the deceptive acts.
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"Do you really get what you pay for?" - Compensation of Mortgage
Brokers Restricted by the Eleventh Circuit
by Robert Kurinsky

Few individuals who
take out mortgage loans
receive the lowest interest
rate available. While that
may be expected, the
disbursement of the excess
interest is restricted by
federal law. Specifically,
the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act ("RESPA")
prohibits lenders from
providing mortgage
brokers with kickbacks or
referral fees. However,
payments in exchange for
either goods or services
are not prohibited by
RESPA. In Culpepperv.
Inland Mortgage Corp.,
1998 WL 5591 (1998), the
United States Court of
Appeals of the Eleventh
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Circuit ruled that a
contractual payment by a
lender to a mortgage
broker for the origination
of a loan above the
lender's minimum interest
rate was a prohibited
referral fee. In rendering
this decision, the court
reversed the district court
decision granting Inland's
motion for summary
judgment.
Class Action Suit Creates
Case of First Impression
by Alleging a Yield
Spread Premium to be a
Violation of RESPA
The appellants, John and
Patricia Culpepper, were

the named plaintiffs in a
class action suit against
the appellee, Inland
Mortgage Corporation
("Inland"), for an alleged
violation of RESPA
§2607(a). That section of
RESPA specifically
prohibits the payment of
referral fees in the
provision of brokerage
services. The Culpeppers
went to a mortgage
broker, Premiere Mortgage
Company ("Premiere"),
and obtained a federally
insured loan. However,
Premiere did not fund the
Culpeppers' mortgage
loan. Instead, Premiere
only provided the service
of matching the
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